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An Untimely Death of Wrongful
Death Claims: Ohio Removes
Decedent-Employee Wrongful Death
Claims from the Arbitral Forum
Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the life and death of Bob.2 Due to his employer's negligence, Bob
is severely injured at work. As soon as that injury occurs, a legal action for per-
sonal injury arises, and Bob may sue the wrongdoer (his employer). However,
when Bob dies as a result of his injuries, his one claim becomes two. The first is a
survival action, which derives from common law and now exists in the statutory
codes of virtually all jurisdictions 3 and allows Bob's representative to bring on
Bob's behalf any claims he had against his employer.4 The second is a wrongful
death action, which did not exist at common law; it came only through statutory
enactment. 5 This action was created to allow Bob's beneficiaries to collect dam-
ages for their injuries as a result of his death.6
When Bob dies, Bob's representative could file either action in order that his
estate (in survival) or beneficiaries (in wrongful death) be compensated for losses
stenmmiing from his injuries or death. But in Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings
Company, a more complex issue arose-what if Bob signed an agreement to arbi-
trate all of his claims against his employer? Would that bind Bob's representative
to arbitrate an action in survival? In wrongful death? Both? The Ohio Supreme
Court answered that Bob's representative would be compelled to arbitrate the
survival claim, but not the wrongful death claim, as the latter is independent from
the former. Bob's beneficiaries may proceed in court on the wrongful death
claim, even as the survival claim proceeds in arbitration, and even though Bob
signed an agreement to arbitrate his disputes.
1. 873 N.E.2d 1258 (Ohio 2007).
2. This character is fictional, and this is merely a hypothetical.
3. E.g,. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.21 (West 2006). See also Armes v. Thompson, 222 S.W.3d
79, 82 (Tex. App. 2006) (Survival exists to "prevent a decedent's common law action from being
abated because of their death.").
4. Such claims include hospital bills, funeral expenses, etc.
5. See, e.g., People v. Giordano, 170 P.3d 623 (Cal. 2007); Armantrout v. Carlson, 170 P.3d 1218
(Wash. Ct. App. 2007); Blackmon v. Tenet Healthsystem Spalding, Inc., 653 S.E.2d 333 (Ga. Ct. App.
2007). This action also exists in virtually all states' codes. E.g,. OtIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01.
6. For example, the inability to "profit" from the companionship Bob offered, the loss of Bob's
earnings, etc.
1
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1I. FACTS AND HOLDING
The plaintiff in this case was Alice Peters ("Peters"), the wife of and estate
administrator for William Peters ("decedent"). 7 Decedent was formerly employed
by defendant, Columbus Steel Castings Company ("CSC"), through ELS, Inc. 8
Upon beginning to work for CSC, decedent signed an agreement ("the Plan")
governing his employment with CSC.9 The Plan contained an arbitration provi-
sion I ° which purported to compel decedent and his "heirs, beneficiaries, succes-
sors, and assigns" to arbitrate matters relating to his employment.'"
Roughly one week after commencing his employment with CSC, decedent
died while working, having fallen fifty feet from a catwalk. 12 Thereafter, Peters
filed suit in Ohio state court on grounds of wrongful death
13 
and survival.14
CSC responded to this complaint by moving for dismissal due to lack of ju-
risdiction, or, alternatively, compulsion of arbitration and a stay of the proceed-
ings. 15 CSC contended that Peters was bound by the arbitration provisions in the
Plan.' 6 Peters countered that neither she, nor decedent's other beneficiaries, could
be bound by an agreement which they did not sign. 17 Over CSC's objection, the
trial court adopted a magistrate's decision that the Plan could not preclude dece-
dent's beneficiaries (represented here by Peters) from asserting a wrongful death
claim in court. 18 CSC appealed. 19
On appeal, CSC singularly argued that the trial court erred in not enforcing
the Plan against plaintiff.2 0 Operating under a de novo standard of review, 2' the
7. Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., No. 05AP-308, 2006 WL 225274, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
Jan. 31, 2006).
8. Id. ELS was an "employee leasing agency," hired by CSC for recruitment purposes. Id.
9. Id. The agreement was contained in a document called "Dispute Resolution Plan Acknowledge-
ment of Receipt and Agreement to Be Bound." Id.
10. Id. The provision read, "I agree that hereafter I will be bound by the Company's Dispute Resolu-
tion Plan .... I understand and agree that mediation, and, if unsuccessful, arbitration ... will be my
sole and exclusive remedies for any legal claims... I may have against the Company regarding my
employment..." Id. The plan expressly covered legal tort claims. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (West 2006):
When the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default which would have en-
tifled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued, the
person who would have been liable if death had not ensued ... shall be liable to an action for
damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured...
14. Peters, 2006 WL 225274, at *1. An action in "survival" is merely an extension of decedent's tort
action past the decedent's death; the right to bring suit "survives" to the decedent's representative.
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.21. Plaintiff's theory was premised on CSC's knowledge of the "danger
inherent" in requiring employees to work on catwalks, its knowledge that "harm to its employees was
substantially certain to occur," and CSC's inaction regarding further employee safety - this amounted
to a claim that CSC intentionally caused Peters' death. Peters, 2006 WL 225274, at *1.
15. Id. at *2.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. The magistrate did mandate arbitration, in accordance with the Plan, as to the survival action
Peters brought in tandem with the wrongful death action. Id. For that reason, Peters voluntarily dis-
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appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court.22 The appellate court's rea-
soning was twofold: the lack of any agreement to arbitrate between Peters (or
decedent's other beneficiaries) and CSC; and the severability of a wrongful death
action from the decedent's action in survival.23
CSC then made, and the Ohio Supreme Court accepted, a discretionary appeal
to clarify whether an individual, by agreeing to arbitrate his claims against a par-
ticular defendant, can bind his beneficiaries to arbitrate a wrongful death claim
against that same defendant.24 The court affirmed the appellate court's decision,
holding that an employee's agreement to arbitrate all his disputes regarding his
employment may not similarly bind his beneficiaries to arbitrate a wrongful death
action against his employer.
25
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
There are several inquiries central to the question of whether a decedent's be-
neficiaries should be bound by the decedent's arbitration agreement with his em-
ployer-for example, whether the parties intended such a result.26 The most im-
portant inquiry for the Ohio Supreme Court in Peters was its precedent concerning
the relationship between a personal tort claim a decedent may have had prior to
his death and a subsequent wrongful death claim brought by his beneficiaries.27
There is considerable conflict, across federal and state courts, as to how to resolve
this inquiry.
A. The Interaction Between Wrongful Death and Survival Claims
A survival claim is merely an extension of a decedent's tort claim notwith-
standing the decedent's death. The effect of such a claim on the existence of a
wrongful death action in the decedent's representative and beneficiaries varies by
jurisdiction. The variable is whether the wrongful death action is treated as deriv-
ative of the surviving tort action.
In a majority of jurisdictions, the wrongful death action is treated as deriva-
tive of the survival action.29 "Derivative" means "dependent upon a wrong com-
21. Id. The court had to choose between this standard of review and an "abuse of discretion" stan-
dard, because Ohio appellate courts had split over the issue in the past. Id. The court chose the de novo
standard because "the resolution of this case tum[ed] upon a question of law ....I Id.
22. Id. at *6.
23. Id. at *3-*5. The court explained that the wrongful death claim, unlike the survival claim, did not
belong to the decedent; rather, it belonged to his beneficiaries, for injuries sustained by them as a result
of his death. Id.at *5. On this basis, the court said the two claims should be treated as distinct from one
another. Id.
24. Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 873 N.E.2d 1258, 1260 (Ohio 2007).
25. Id. at 1262.
26. See, e.g., In re Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 235 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. 2007).
27. See discussion, infra Part B.
28. See discussion, supra note 14.
29. Elizabeth Clark, Comment, Impacts of Modern Life Support Techniques on Wrongful Death
Actions Brought after Final Personal Injury Judgments, 16 U. PUGEr SOUND L. REv. 711, 716 (Winter
1993) (citing Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 579-80 (1974); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 946, 954-56 (5th ed. 1984)). See also Frontier
Ins. Co. v. Blaty, 454 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006) (construing Michigan law); Stamp v. Vail Corp., 172
No. 2]
3
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mitted upon another person. ' 3° If a jurisdiction views the relationship between
survival and wrongful death actions in this manner, anything preventing the dece-
dent from litigating a cause of action will similarly "prevent[] survivors from
bringing a wrongful death suit."'31 For example, in Union Bank of California, N.A.
v. Copeland Lumber Yards, Inc., the court explained that the derivative nature of a
wrongful death action comes from the language of the relevant statute.32 There,
the court read the language to imply that if the decedent would not have been able
to bring a claim on his injury before he died, his personal representative should
not be allowed to pursue such a claim after his death.33 The effect of such a read-
ing is that the decedent's personal tort claim and his representative's subsequent
wrongful death claim are deemed inseparable.34
The contrary interpretation of wrongful death statutes is that personal injury
survival actions and wrongful death actions are independent of one another.
35
That view treats the claims as if "the injured person and his beneficiaries each had
a separate legal interest in his life, assertable by separate action." 36 This view
treats the absence of a viable claim in the decedent as having no bearing on the
viability of a subsequent wrongful death claim by his personal representative.37
For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court in St. Paul Mercury Insurance Compa-
ny v. Circuit Court of Craighead County read Arkansas' wrongful death statute as
involving "neither the same action, nor the same plaintiff as a survival action
brought by the same person in his individual capacity ... "38 The court therefore
P.3d 437 (Colo. banc 2007); Saunders v. Hill, 202 A.2d 807 (Del. 1964); Mowell v. Marks, 603 S.E.2d
702 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Union Bank of Cal. N.A. v. Copeland Lumber Yards, Inc., 160 P.3d 1032
(Or. Ct. App. 2007) ("The [wrongful death] statute, in effect, 'places a decedent's personal representa-
tive in the decedent's shoes, imputing to the personal representative whatever rights, and limitations to
those rights, that the decedent possessed."' (quoting Storm v. McClung, 47 P.3d 476, 482 (Or. 2002));
Sunderland v. R.A. Barlow Homebuilders, 791 A.2d 384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); County of Dallas v.
Sempe, 151 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. App. 2004).
30. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Death § 22 (2008). The notion, in treating the wrongful death action as deriva-
tive, is that no wrong has been effected upon the claimants - the personal representative and beneficia-
ries of the decedent. Id.
31. Clark, supra note 29, at 717; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 46, cmt.b
(1982) ("If the claim for wrongful death is treated as wholly 'derivative,' the beneficiaries of the death
action can sue only if the decedent would still be in a position to sue.").
32. 160 P.3d 1032, 1035-36 (Or. Ct. App. 2007). The statute reads:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal
representative of the decedent. . . may maintain an action against the wrongdoer, if the decedent
might have maintained an action, had the decedent lived, against the wrongdoer for an injury
done by the same act or omission.
Id. at 1035 (citing OR. REV. CODE § 30.020(l) (2007)) (emphasis added). Note that the emphasized
language is similar to Ohio's wrongful death statute.
33. Copeland Lumber, 160 P.3d at 1036.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, at § 46 cmt.b.
36. Id.
37. See generally St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Cir. Ct. of Craighead County, W. Div., 73 S.W.3d 584
(Ark. 2002); Walls v. Am. Optical Corp., 740 So. 2d 1262 (La. 1999).
38. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 73 S.W.3d at 589. The "same person" is the decedent's personal
representative. Id. The Arkansas wrongful death statute reads, in part:
Whenever the death of a person ... shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default... such
as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action... if death had not ensued .... the
person or company or corporation that would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be
liable to an action for damages...
[Vol. 2008
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drew no connection between survival and wrongful death actions, aside from
those inherently present between the claimant involved (the representative, in both
instances) and the elements of the claim (both commonly based on some form of
negligence).39
The main element that distinguishes between the two views is the controlling
court's interpretation of the underlying wrongful death statute.n° Ohio takes the
minority position-that wrongful death and survival actions are independent from
one another.
B. The Independence of Wrongful Death from Survival Claims in Ohio
As in other states, Ohio has separate statutes providing for survival and
wrongful death claims. 41 However, Ohio courts treat the Ohio Wrongful Death
Statute as "the only civil remedy available to compensate surviving beneficia-
ries. ' 42 This view is in line with the reasoning behind the creation of an action for
wrongful death in the first place-to give beneficiaries redress for their injuries,
which resulted from the decedent's death.43
In Thompson v. Wing,44 the Ohio Supreme Court positioned Ohio among
those states which treat wrongful death and survival claims as independent from
one another.45 There, the decedent, a woman afflicted with cancer, filed a medical
malpractice action before she died.46 She claimed damages of lost earnings and
earning capacity, diminution of life expectancy, and pain and suffering.47 The
decedent won a jury trial in the amount of $50,000; the defendants did not ap-
peal.48
The decedent died following the conclusion of the trial, and the personal rep-
resentative of her estate filed a wrongful death action against the same parties and
on essentially the same allegations as those underlying the decedent's medical
malpractice action.49 Defendants, a hospital and practicing physician, obtained
summary judgment, partially on the basis of "a plain reading of the wrongful
death statute[s]." 50 The Ohio appellate court reversed, stating that wrongful death
and malpractice actions arising from the same wrongful act are "distinct [and]
independent" from one another. 51 The Ohio Supreme Court then granted a motion
to clarify the record.52
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102(a)(1) (West 2008).
39. Id.
40. This is true despite the fact most state wrongful death statutes are very similar. Compare OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (West 2006) with OR. REV. STAT. § 30.020(1) (2006).
41. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 2125.01; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.21
42. Griffiths v. Doctors Hosp., 780 N.E.2d 603, 605 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted).
43. See generally Clark, supra note 29; Warrum v. U.S., 427 F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 2005).
44. 637 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio 1994).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 918. The basis for her claim was "negligence and malpractice [causing] a substantial delay
in the diagnosis of her cancer." Id.
47. id. at 918-19.
48. Id. at 919.
49. Id.
50. Id. The trial court also considered the doctrine of collateral estoppel in finding for defendants. Id.
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That court affirmed the appellate court's ruling that the language of Ohio's
wrongful death statute 53 would not bar a wrongful death action even though the
decedent's malpractice action was litigated before she died. 54 Acknowledging
divergent views elsewhere, the court noted two precedents that established the
independent nature of a wrongful death action in Ohio.55 The implication of the
independence of the wrongful death claim, the court explained, was that the right
to bring that claim could not depend on "the existence of a separate cause of ac-
tion" held by the decedent before her death.56 Therefore, the decedent's repre-
sentative was allowed to sue the defendants for wrongful death, even though the
decedent had previously litigated the malpractice action personally.5 7 As a result,
there were two separate claims arising out of one singular event. But there is one
major distinction existed between Thompson and Peters-Thompson had nothing
to do with a wrongful death claim in the context of an arbitration agreement.
C. General Principles Regarding Treatment of Agreements Binding
Parties to Arbitrate Disputes
Unlike Thompson, the wrongful death claim in Peters related to an arbitration
agreement between the decedent and his employer.5 8 And although arbitration
principles had little if anything to do with the outcome in Peters,59 those principles
remain relevant to the treatment of the arbitration provision in the Plan, which
governed the decedent's employment.
In determining whether parties have agreed to arbitrate a dispute, courts apply
ordinary contract principles.60  Accordingly, an arbitration agreement must be
53. Oio REV. CODE ANN §2125.01 (West 2006). At issue was the necessity, under the statute, that
the decedent would have been entitled to damages "if death had not ensued . . ." Thompson, 637
N.E.2d at 920. Defendants argued this language barred a wrongful death action because a decedent's
litigation of a malpractice action would have extinguished her entitlement to damages had she not died,
as such an entitlement would be duplicative. Id. at 919-20.
54. Id. at 922. Specifically, the court narrowly held that "a recovery in a medical malpractice action
by a decedent during his or her lifetime does not bar a subsequent wrongful death action brought
pursuant to [the statute] on behalf of the decedent's beneficiaries." Id.
55. Id. (discussing Mahoning Valley Ry. Co. v. Van Alstine, 83 N.E. 601 (Ohio 1908) (claimant
allowed to continue decedent's personal injury claim in survival, and thereafter institute separate
wrongful death action); May Coal Co. v. Robinette, 165 N.E. 576 (Ohio 1929) (claimant who pursued
survival and wrongful death claims concurrently allowed to maintain wrongful death action even after
losing on survival claim)).
56. Thompson, 637 N.E.2d at 922.
57. Id. The court further provided that collateral estoppel should prevent parties from having to re-
litigate in a wrongful death action issues that were already decided in the previous suit. Id. at 923. In
this case, that meant the representative benefitted from the finding of defendants' liabilities in the
previous suit. See id.
58. See discussion, supra Facts and Holding.
59. These principles were barely mentioned. See Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 873 N.E.2d
1258, 1260-61 (Ohio 2007).
60. Such principles include giving effect to the terms of the contract, and determining the intent of
the parties to the contract. See, e.g., City of Beaumont v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local Union No.
399, 241 S.W.3d 208 (Tex. App. 2007); Thompson v. Bar-S Foods Co., 174 P.3d 567 (Okla. 2007);
Smith v. Multi-Fin. Secs. Corp., 171 P.3d 1267 (Colo. App. 2007); Ashley River Props. 1, LLC v.
Ashley River Props. II, LLC, 648 S.E.2d 295 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007); Bucks Orthopaedic Surgery As-
socs., P.C. v. Ruth, 925 A.2d 868 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 257
[Vol. 2008
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enforced according to its terms. 61 Moreover, in determining the meaning of the
terms of an arbitration agreement, a court must attempt to determine the parties'
intent in entering the agreement. 62 And as is generally true with all contracts, the
only parties who can be bound to an arbitration agreement are those who agree to
be bound.63
Furthermore, as there is a general presumption in favor of arbitration in all
courts within the U.S., any doubts regarding the scope of an arbitration agreement
must be resolved in favor of arbitration. 64 This presumption comes directly from
the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.65 As a result, "arbitration agreements may be
,66more likely [to be enforced] than other kinds of contracts." And an agreement
should be enforced "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitra-
tion clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dis-
,,67pute. The breadth of this presumption can be seen where a court upholds an
arbitration agreement unless one of two elements exists: an express exclusion of a
particular type of grievance, or "strong evidence.., of a purpose to exclude the
grievance" from the agreement.
68
Ohio's statute providing arbitration as a forum for dispute resolution follows
this federal presumption.69 However, the presumption has limitations, in Ohio and
elsewhere. For example, a party generally cannot be bound to arbitrate claims he
did not agree to submit to arbitration.70 In Stillings v. Franklin Township Board of
S.W.3d 566 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007); The Dunes of GP, L.L.C. v. Bradford, 966 So.2d 924 (Ala. 2007);
Sisneros v. Citadel Broad. Co., 142 P.3d 34 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
61. E.g., Eiseman Levine Lehrhaupt & Kakoyiannis, P.C. v. Torino Jewelers, Ltd., 844 N.Y.S.2d
242, 244 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
62. See, e.g., Titolo v. Cano, 68 Cal.Rptr. 3d 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Hospicecare of Se. Fla., Inc.
v. Major, 968 So.2d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); In re Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 235 S.W.3d 206
(Tex. 2007); State v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 927 A.2d 503 (N.H. 2007); Sooner Builders & Invs.,
Inc. v. Nolan Hatcher Constr. Servs., 164 P.3d 1063 (Okla. 2007); BFN-Greeley, LLC v. Adair Group,
141 P.3d 937 (Colo. App. 2006)). For example, arbitration clauses using phrases like "arising out of"
should be presumed to be intended by the parties to be broad in scope. Smith v. Multi-Fin. Secs. Corp.,
171 P.3d 1267, 1270 (Colo. App. 2007).
63. See, e.g., Steritech Group, v. MacKenzie, 970 So.2d 895, 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting
Liberty Commc'ns v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 733 So.2d 571, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) ("Courts
are powerless to compel arbitration in the absence of a contract in which both parties have agreed to
submit their grievances to arbitration.")); Horseshoe Entm't v. Lepinski, 923 So.2d 929, 934 (La. Ct.
App. 2006). Usually, this language refers to parties who sign the agreement. See discussion, infra
subsection D of this section.
64. See, e.g., Ignazio v. Clear Channel Broad Inc., 865 N.E.2d 18 (Ohio 2007); Steritech, 970 So.2d
895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Titolo, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616; UBS Fin. Servs. v. Branton, 241 S.W.3d
179 (Tex. App. 2007); JBS Farms, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Agribusiness, Inc., 205 S.W.3d 910 (Mo.
App. S.D. 2006).
65. See Anthony M. DiLeo, The Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements by and Against Nonsigna-
tories, 2 J. AM. ARB. 31, 35 (2003) (discussing the FAA).
66. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
67. Id. (quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-
83 (1960)).
68. Stillings v. Franklin Twp. Bd. of Trs., 646 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
69. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01(A) (West 2006) ("A provision in any written contract ... to
settle by arbitration a controversy that subsequently arises out of the contract ... shall be valid, irre-
vocable, and enforceable, except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.").
70. Palkovitz v. Fraiberg, 702 N.E.2d 935, 937 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1997). This follows the contract
principle that agreements only bind parties that agree to be bound. See supra, text accompanying note
No. 21
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Trustees, an Ohio appellate court directly addressed the presumption in favor of
arbitration. 71 There, the court delineated arbitration agreements as of two types-
"(1) unlimited clauses providing for arbitration of all disputes that may arise out
of the parties' contractual relationship, and (2) limited clauses providing for arbi-
tration of only specific types of contractual disputes." 72 The court therefore im-
plied that an arbitration agreement will be applicable to any dispute arising out of
it with only two clear exceptions: where the agreement's express terms, or the
parties' evidenced intent, render it inapplicable to a specific dispute.73
These arbitral principles can be difficult for courts to apply. One circums-
tance exemplifying the complexity of their application is where the question arises
whether an arbitration provision should be enforced against a party who did not
sign the agreement containing the provision.74
D. The Arbitrability of Claims Brought by Non-signatory Parties
The wrongful death claim in Peters directly resulted from an agreement be-
tween the decedent and his employer. Therefore, it was signed by the decedent
but not by Peters or any of the decedent's other beneficiaries.75 This fact pattern
evokes the general principle in arbitration that a party who does not sign an arbi-
tration agreement (a "non-signatory") cannot be bound by that agreement.76
However, there are exceptions to this principle, such as where an agency relation-
ship exists between a signatory and the non-signatory, or when the non-signatory
is a third-party beneficiary of the agreement.77 The following are several illustra-
tions of courts binding parties to arbitrate their disputes against a signatory party,
notwithstanding the parties' statuses as a non-signatory.
Commentators have stated that, in tort cases78 where claimants are found to
bound by arbitration agreements to which they were not parties, the common
theme is that the torts are related to performance under the contracts at issue.
79
63. However, there are exceptions even to that limitation. See, e.g., Covington v. Lucia, 784 N.E.2d
186, 189 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2003); SouthTrust Bank v. Ford, 835 So.2d 990, 993-94 (Ala. 2002).
For the same reason the powers of an executor or an administrator encompasses [sic] all of those
formerly held by the decedent, those powers must likewise be restricted in the same manner and
to the same extent as the powers of the decedent would have been. Thus, where an executor or
administrator asserts a claim on behalf of the estate, he or she must also abide by the terms of any
valid agreement, including an arbitration agreement, entered into by the decedent.
Id.
71. Stillings, 646 N.E.2d at 1187.
72. Id. (citations omitted).
73. See id.
74. In Peters, an Ohio court confronted this specific issue for the first time; the following section
provides case law from state courts outside Ohio.
75. See discussion, supra Facts and Holding.
76. See, e.g., Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLC, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007);
World Rentals & Sales, LLC v. Volvo Constr. Equip. Rents, Inc., 517 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2008);
Crowley Mar. Corp. v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 605 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Steri-
tech Group v. MacKenzie, 970 So. 2d 895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). This principle comes from the
general idea that parties cannot be bound to contracts where they did not agree to be bound. See id.
77. See generally World Rentals, 517 F.3d at 1244; Crowley Mar., 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 611.
78. Note that tort cases become actions in survival when the original claimant dies.
79. Corey D. Hinshaw & Lindsay G. Watts, A Review of Mississippi Law Regarding Arbitration, 76
Miss. L.J. 1007, 1020 (Spring 2007).
[Vol. 2008
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Thus, those torts "were explicitly agreed to and contemplated by the parties upon
execution of the contract[s]. 80 For example, in the Mississippi case of Cleveland
v. Mann,8' decedent, a medical patient, agreed that he would arbitrate any dispute
"relating to the performance of medical services." 82 Additionally, the agreement
purported to bind the patient's heirs and/or personal representative.83 The court
saw this as a circumstance in which holding the non-signatory to the terms of the
agreement was dictated by ordinary contract and agency principles. 84 The court
added that the "death of a party to an agreement to arbitrate.., does not invalidate
the agreement," and that the court must respect the intent of the parties as clearly
expressed in the agreements' terms.
In addition, federal courts have held non-signatories to be bound by arbitra-
tion provisions where the parties seek to benefit from the terms of the agreement
containing the arbitration provision.86  International Paper concerned a non-
signatory buyer's claim as it related to an agreement between a distributor and
manufacturer.87 The buyer claimed damages arising out of the warranty and dam-
ages provisions of the distributor-manufacturer agreement; however, the buyer
claimed not to be bound by the arbitration provision contained in that same
agreement. 88 The court relied on an estoppel theory in ruling that the buyer was
bound to arbitrate under the agreement.8 9 Under that theory, a non-signatory party
cannot escape an agreement's arbitration provision "when he has consistently
maintained that the other provisions of the same contract should be enforced to
benefit him."
90
Finally, two Supreme Court of Alabama decisions have identified dual theo-
ries that combine to bind a non-signatory to a car-purchase agreement containing
an arbitration clause-the spousal relationship between the signatory and the non-
signatory, and the factual relationship between the spouses' claims.91 In Georgia
Power Company v. Partin, the husband's action stemmed from an operations con-
tract between his employer and the facility at which he was injured. 92 When the
wife followed suit with a loss of consortium claim stemming from those same
injuries, the court deemed her bound to arbitrate those claims even though she did
not sign the purchase agreement. 93 In holding the non-signatory wife bound by
the arbitration provision, the court reasoned that although the wife had a claim
80. Id.
81. 942 So. 2d 108 (Miss. 2006).
82. Id. at 113 (quoting the arbitration agreement).
83. Id. at 117.
84. Id. at 118.
85. Id. The court also concisely discussed Mississippi's wrongful death statute in determining the
beneficiaries must be bound under the agreement. Id. at 118-19.
86. DiLeo, supra note 65, at 53-55 (citing Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen,
206 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000)).
87. Int'l Paper, 206 F.3d at 413.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 417-18.
90. DiLeo, supra note 65, at 56 (citing Int'l Paper, 206 F.3d at 418). The court referred to this as the
"direct benefit" doctrine. Id.
91. See Ritter v. Grady Auto. Group, 973 So. 2d 1058 (Ala. 2007); Ga. Power Co. v. Partin, 727
So.2d 2 (Ala. 1998).
92. 727 So. 2d at 4.
93. Id. at 7.
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wholly separate from her husband's, the two claims "[sprung] from the same
source, i.e., the operations contract."
94
More recently, the Alabama Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in Partin
when it faced a similar situation in Ritter v. Grady Automobile Group.9 5 There,
the wife purchased a car, signed agpurchase agreement containing an arbitration
clause, and was injured thereafter. Her husband, a non-signatory, then filed a
loss of consortium action, in the pleading of which he cited to his wife's injuries
and the agreement between her and the dealership. 97 Just as it had done in Partin,
the court found the husband to be bound by the arbitration agreement signed by
his injured wife because both spouses' injuries arose from the same agreement. 98
As discussed below, this situation is not unlike that in Peters v. Columbus Steel
Castings Co.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Peters,99 the Ohio Supreme Court separated its analysis into two distinct
branches.i °° The first branch concerned whether a non-signatory to an arbitration
agreement can be bound by that agreement.' 0' The court dealt swiftly with this
question, laying out the principle that arbitration is a matter of contract and, thus,
it can only be compelled as to parties who agree to submit to it.' °2 The court ex-
plained that deriving from that principle is the notion that since decedent's benefi-
ciaries did not themselves agree to arbitrate claims arising out of his employment,
they could not be bound by an agreement governing it.
0 3
The second branch of the court's analysis concerned whether a survival ac-
tion, brought before the death of an employee, can be viewed as independent from
a wrongful death action arising out of the same circumstances and between the
same parties. 104 To answer this question, the court first considered Ohio's wrong-
ful death statutes.10 5 The court found compelling the language in one provision,
which described the wrongful death action as "for the exclusive benefit" of the
decedent's beneficiaries. 106 The court focused on the reason for an administrator's
94. Id. at 6.
95. 973 So. 2d 1058.
96. Id. at 1060.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1065.
99. 873 N.E.2d 1258 (Ohio 2007).
100. Id. at 1260.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1260-61. The court here delineated an aggrieved party's constitutional right to seek redress
in court. Id.
103. Id. at 1261.
104. Id. at 1260. The importance of this question stemmed from the fact that in a survival action, an
agreement between the decedent and his employer would bind all members of the decedent's estate,
because the survival action "belonged" to the decedent, for his injuries. Id. at 1261. Therefore, the
action would not be severable from the decedent, nor from his agreement with his employer, making
the arbitration provision applicable against the estate bringing suit. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting Osio REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(A)(1) (West 2006).
[A] civil action for wrongful death shall be brought in the name of the personal representative of
the decedent for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, the children, and the parents of the
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involvement in a wrongful death claim-to efficiently enable the decedent's bene-
ficiaries to remedy their injuries stemming from the decedent's death. 7
Next, the court looked to precedent. 08 The court pointed to Mahoning Valley
Ry. Co. v. Van Alstine, 109 where an administrator was allowed to litigate a wrong-
ful death action after having litigated a survival action on the same facts." 0 The
court then consulted Thompson v. Wing"I to clear up any remaining ambiguity
regarding this matter." 2 In that case, noting the split of state authority regarding
the relationship between survival and wrongful death actions," 3 the court took the
position that litigation of a survival action would not bar subsequent litigation of a
wrongful death action.
4
The court, based on its construction of Ohio's wrongful death statute and its
precedent in Thompson, determined that Ohio courts would treat wrongful death
and survival claims as independent actions." 5 The court determined that the Plan,
which purported to bind the decedent's "heirs, beneficiaries, successors and as-
signs" to arbitration, applied only to an action in survival, because such an action
involved the decedent's claims." 6 The court reasoned that a wrongful death ac-
tion involves not the decedent's claims, but those of his beneficiaries." 7 The
court concluded that the decedent could not by agreement bind his beneficiaries to
arbitrate their wrongful death action." 8 As a result, the Plan could not bind Peters
to arbitrate the wrongful death claim against the employer, and Peters was granted
the right to litigate her wrongful death claim in a court of law, independently of
the survival claim and on behalf of all beneficiaries.
V. COMMENT
Peters irrevocably will cause two problems. First, the treatment of wrongful
death claims as independent from survival claims unavoidably will disrupt Ohio's
decedent, all of whom are rebuttably presumed to have suffered damages by reason of the wrong-
ful death, and for the exclusive benefit of the other next of kin of the decedent.
Id. (emphasis added by Peters).
107. Peters, 873 N.E.2d at 1261.
108. Id.
109. 83 N.E. 601 (Ohio 1908).
110. Id. at 604-05. The court noted that the Mahoning court plainly stated that survival and wrongful
death actions were "not the same." Peters, 873 N.E.2d at 1261 (citing Mahoning, 83 N.E. at 607).
111. 637 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio 1994).
112. Peters, 873 N.E.2d at 1261 (referencing Thompson, 637 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio 1994)).
113. Thompson, 637 N.E.2d at 920-22. A majority of states' courts treated wrongful death actions as
derivative of survival actions; whereas, a minority held survival actions as distinct from wrongful
death actions. Id. at 920. In the former circumstance, litigation of survival would bar that of wrongful
death; in the latter, litigation of survival would not bar that of wrongful death. Id.
114. Id. at 922. The court reasoned that "injured persons may release their own claims [in survival];
they cannot, however, release claims that are not yet in existence and that accrue in favor of persons
other than themselves." Id.(emphasis omitted). There, however, the court did provide that collateral
estoppel would bar a plaintiff from re-litigating individual issues that had already been determined in
the survival action. Id. at 923-24.
115. Peters, 873 N.E.2d at 1262.
116. Id. (i.e., decedent had only agreed to arbitrate his own claims against the company, and not
anyone else's).
117. Id.
118. Id. The court summarily pronounced that arbitration "may not be imposed on the unwilling." Id.
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judicial economy. Second, the court's dismissive attitude toward the arbitral fo-
rum could very well disrupt Ohio's business economy. The root of both problems
is Thompson v. Wing, as that case provided much of the court's reasoning in Pe-
ters. Therefore, one solution would be for the Ohio Supreme Court to quickly
overrule Thompson in favor of treating wrongful death claims as derivative ac-
tions. If not, Ohio business will have to construct employment agreements, and
specifically the arbitration provisions therein, very carefully in order that they be
given their intended effect.
A. Independence of Claims and the Disruption of Judicial Economy
The court in Peters failed to consider the judicial-economic benefits of the
arbitral forum beyond a mere cursory statement." 9 Judicial economy is a phrase
generally referring to the efficiency of the judicial system, specifically in the in-
terests of avoiding the duplication of evidence and undue burden on parties.'
20
Courts often cite to judicial economy when moving toward expeditious resolutions
to disputes.'12
Because Peters dismissed her survival action to pursue wrongful death, 22 the
court did not confront the situation that could ensue if a claimant were to maintain
both actions, pursuing survival in the arbitral forum and wrongful death in court.
One commentator has suggested that "judicial economy [would] likely be tram-
pled" as a result of the severance of wrongful death claims from survival claims in
such a situation, 1 3 because wrongful death and survival actions are inherently
connected. Therefore, they would be most efficiently evaluated together. Each
arises from the same tortious liability of one for the injury of another, such that the
severance of those two claims to different forums would result in separate adjudi-
cations of essentially the same facts. If the survival claim were arbitrated and the
wrongful death claim litigated, it would be entirely possible for the arbitrator and
the court to come to opposite legal conclusions. For example, the claimant could
lose arbitration of the survival action, yet win litigation of the wrongful death
claim. The heavy deference reviewing courts owe arbitral decisions 124 would
likely compel the court to confirm the claimant's loss on survival, giving legal
effect to an arbitral decision opposite its own on the same set of facts.
119. Peters, 873 N.E.2d at 1260 ("While arbitration is encouraged as a form of dispute resolution, the
policy favoring arbitration does not trump the constitutional right to seek redress in court.").
120. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
121. See, e.g., Tinter v. Lucik, 876 N.E.2d 1026, 1035 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); San" v. State, 166 P.3d
891, 895 (Wyo. 2007); McClure v. County of Jackson, 648 S.E.2d 546, 551 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007);
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. v. Spaulding, 930 A.2d 1025 (Me. 2007).
122. Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., No. 05AP-308, 2006 WL 225274, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.
Jan. 31, 2006).
123. Elizabeth K. Stanley, Comment, Parties' Defenses to Binding Arbitration Agreement in the
Health Care Field & the Operation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 38 ST. MARY'S L.J. 591, 632-33
(2007).
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Furthermore, by separating two actions based on the same factual allegations,
the Ohio Supreme Court overspends both judicial time and judicial resources.125
Parties seeking redress under both claims will have to pay for both litigation of the
wrongful death claim and arbitration of the survival claim. In addition, separation
of claims unnecessarily expands the amount of time the parties must devote to the
action, combining months of arbitration 126 with months, if not years, of litiga-
tion. 127 In addition, court dockets that are already full will contain more super-
fluous matters.
Courts can dispose of such monetary and temporal inefficiencies by merely
directing both claims to one forum. Since in cases like Peters the preeminent
claim (survival) will be deemed arbitrable, so too should the wrongful death ac-
tion. Similar claimants would spend far less money and time, while maintaining
the ability to pursue both claims against the tortfeasor. In Peters, the Ohio state
court system would not have lost nearly four years to this matter.' 2 8 Most impor-
tantly, an arbitrator would be able to rule on both claims merely by looking at one
set of facts. In Peters, Peters could have redressed both sets of injuries without
risk of inconsistent rulings. The Ohio Supreme Court could have reached this
efficient result by simply giving effect to the terms of the parties' agreement-an
arbitral principle to which the court did not allocate due consideration.
B. Ohio Courts Must Do More to Encourage Use of the Arbitral Forum
Ohio's arbitration statute provides for the validity of all arbitration agree-
ments, except where they would be invalidated by normal contract principles. 1
29
However, in Peters, the court went only as far as invalidating the decedent's arbi-
tration agreement under one such principle-Peters did not personally agree to
arbitrate disputes under that agreement.' 30 By abbreviating the discussion in this
manner, the court failed to give effect to the agreement's terms, nor did it consider
the idea that non-signatories can be bound to arbitrate disputes under certain cir-
cumstances.
As a principle, courts must give effect to arbitration agreements' terms, which
show the parties' intent.' 31 This principle embraces the idea that determining who
125. This is despite the court's own rules guarding against such action. See OHIO R. CIv. P. 42(A)(1)
(West 2008) (consolidation of multiple actions "involving a common question of law or fact ... to
avoid unnecessary costs or delay").
126. See Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at a Low Cost, 58 DisP.
RESOL. J. 9, 16 (May-July 2003), available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articleslmi-qa3923/is 200305/ai_n9282687/pg_8.
127. E.g., in Peters, the Ohio Supreme Court decision alone took seven months to reach finality. See
Peters, 873 N.E.2d 1258.
128. Peters originally filed suit on Dec. 2, 2003, and the Ohio Supreme Court dealt its final ruling on
Sept. 20, 2007 - the precise amount of time spanned by this action was 1,388 days, or roughly 46.5
months. And as of the disposition of this case, Peters still had not litigated the issue of her wrongful
death claim. See id.; Merit Brief of Appelle, Peters v. Columbus Steel Casting Co., 873 N.E.2d 1258
(Ohio 2007), 2006 WL2982174 at *3.
129. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01(A) (West 2006). See text of statute, supra note 69.
130. Peters, 873 N.E.2d at 1260.
131. See supra, text accompanying notes 61-62. In abiding by this principle, courts have deemed that
a grievance may only be excluded from within the bounds of an arbitration agreement if the agreement
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is bound by an arbitration agreement is not always as simple as who signed it. 13 2
Accordingly, it is not uncommon for a court to enforce an agreement as to a non-
signatory party. 133 However, the Peters court paid little attention to the terms of
the arbitration agreement, which expressly purported to bind his "heirs, beneficia-
ries, successors, and assigns."'' 34 The court therefore disregarded the express in-
tent of both parties that the agreement be binding on all such future parties. The
court also did not consider that this type of clause, relating to any legal claims or
disputes the decedent had relating to his employment, 35 might be intended by the
parties "to include by reference the peripheral and functional writings, relation-
ships, and documents which characterize the complex transactions of business
today."' 136 The court's apparent indifference to this possibility could be viewed as
a slight to the arbitral system. Indeed, it would be difficult for two parties to make
their intent more clear.
The Peters court also did not give due accord to the general presumption in
favor of arbitration.' 37 The backlash of the court's treatment of the arbitral forum
could well be forceful. Supporters of the arbitral forum could feel as though the
treatment undermines judicial confidence in arbitration.' 38 This sentiment could
foster the idea that Ohio's courts generally will not accord due favor to the arbitral
forum, despite parties' apparent intent for such favor. This could result in busi-
nesses, aware of this theme in Ohio's judicial system, to form elsewhere, in juris-
dictions where they could be more confident courts would give effect to their
express arbitration agreements. The overall result could be severe injury to
Ohio's business economy.39
Furthermore, the Peters court's mention of deference to the arbitral forum
was outweighed by the court's cursory conclusion that, seemingly without excep-
tion, "only signatories to an agreement are bound by its terms." 4° This is not
always true, as there are necessarily circumstances under which non-signatory
expressly excluded it, or strong evidence shows the parties' intent to exclude it. See supra, text accom-
panying note 68.
132. DiLeo, supra note 65, at 36 ("'No contract, no arbitration' does not accurately reflect the present
legal complexity of the subject.").
133. Id. at 36-37 (citing Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen, 206 F.3d 411, 416
(4th Cir. 2000); Thomson-C.S.F., S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995)).
134. Peters, 873 N.E.2d at 1260.
135. Id. Much could be made of the fact that the agreement purported to cover only the decedent's
claims against his employer. However, this part of the agreement only gives added effect, concerning
the parties' intent, of the following portion that expressly bound the decedent's heirs to arbitrate such
disputes.
136. DiLeo, supra note 65, at 73.
137. Peters, 873 N.E.2d at 1260-61. See supra, text accompanying note 119.
138. This view would stem from the fact that, although arbitration resulted in a different legal inter-
pretation of the facts, the court maintains its own interpretation for the purpose of the litigated claim.
139. See Texas v. Ohio, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2008, at A16, available at
http://online.wsj.comarticle/SB120450306595906431.html. Interestingly, the Ohio business economy
is currently flailing, while that of Texas is booming. It might not be a coincidence that Texas courts
seem to be more interested in giving effect to parties' intentions in arbitration agreements. See, e.g.,
Sikes v. Heritage Oaks W. Ret. Vill., 238 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App. 2007).
140. Peters, 873 N.E.2d at 1260. The court further stated, "unless [CSC] proves that Peters's [sic]
beneficiaries specifically agreed to arbitrate their wrongful death claims, they should not be bound to
do so." Id. at 1261. This runs in direct opposition to federal court language. See Wash. Mut. Fin. Group
v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 267 (5th Cir. 2004) ("It does not follow [that] ... an obligation to arbitrate
attaches only to one who has personally signed the written arbitration provision.").
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parties can be bound by arbitration agreements. One such instance is where the
non-signatory's claim could not have existed but for the contractual relationship
between two parties. 141 Courts bind such a non-signatory because in bringing her
claims, she inherently must rely on the signatories' underlying agreement. For
example, in Peters, without the employment agreement between the decedent and
his employer, Peters never would have had a wrongful death claim-that claim
resulted from a breach by the employer of a duty that arose only under the em-
ployment agreement.1
42
Finally, the breadth of the Peters holding is troubling. It is without limiting
language. Therefore, it is probable that spouses or other parties with similarly
intimate relationships, dealing with happenstance contracts such as basic goods-
purchase agreements, could overcome arbitral conventions merely by having only
one member of the relationship sign the agreement. Any claim arising from the
agreement involving a non-signatory would be held not arbitrable, unless the Ohio
Supreme Court suddenly decides to flout its established precedent.
C. The Thompson Precedent and Ohio's Uncertain Future
The brunt of the court's reasoning in Peters derived from Thompson v.
Wing. 143 There, the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed that Ohio courts would treat
wrongful death and survival claims as separate and independent from each oth-
er. 144 The court decided this notwithstanding the fact that, when death from injury
is not immediate, a wrongful death action is inherently dependent on the existence
of a prior tort action. 45 Moreover, Thompson had nothing to do with wrongful
death actions in the context of arbitration. Nevertheless, it was binding precedent
regarding the independent nature of wrongful death actions in Ohio, and because
of it, Ohio remains among the minority of states in its treatment of wrongful death
actions. 146
However, the Ohio legislature may not be as convinced of the independence
of wrongful death claims as the Ohio Supreme Court. Ohio lawmakers showed
their uncertainty in 1996, when they voted to amend Ohio's wrongful death sta-
tute, 147 transforming it from one virtually identical to the present version into one
which "effectively overrul[ed]" Thompson.148 It is certainly possible that the leg-
141. See discussion, supra LEGAL BACKGROUND Section D.
142. It is certainly possible for a claimant to possess a claim for wrongful death without the existence
of a contract. See generally Rufo v. Simpson, 103 Cal.Rptr. 2d 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (parents of
murder victim prevailed in wrongful death action against alleged killer). However, where a claim as to
an employee's death is based on employer-negligence, the beneficiary-claimant unavoidably relies on
the employment agreement, for that agreement created the duty the employer has allegedly breached.
143. 637 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio 1994). See discussion, supra in LEGAL BACKGROUND Section B for a
synopsis of this case.
144. Id. at 182-83.
145. It is important that death not be immediate, as was the case in Peters, because clearly if death
were immediate a wrongful death claim could exist without a prior injury claim - there would be no
"injury" in such a case; only death. However, if death is not immediate, there must have been a prior
injury, which led to the death.
146. Other such states include Arkansas and Louisiana. See supra, text accompanying note 37.
147. 1996 Ohio Legis. Serv. Ann. 1O/L-3379 (West).
148. Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform in 1998: The War Continues, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 539,
542 n. 1 (1997). As enacted, Section 2125.01(B) (1) disallowed a death action if the wrongdoer lost a
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islature will reevaluate this issue at some future time, possibly forcing the Ohio
Supreme Court to reevaluate its treatment of wrongful death claims. For now,
though, Ohio businesses are stuck with the court's current interpretation, and they
would do well to consider how to prevent that interpretation from affecting them
the same way it affected CSC in Peters.
D. Business Practices in Ohio in the Meantime
Peters made it clear that, in Ohio, when an employer and employee agree to
arbitrate disputes flowing from the employment relationship, that agreement will
not cover wrongful death claims brought by a deceased employee's representative.
An effective solution to this problem would be for the Ohio Supreme Court to
overrule Thompson v. Wing and join the majority of states in treating a wrongful
death action as derivative of a decedent's action upon the death-causing injury.
After all, the injury did cause the death, and surely parties would intend that if
injury claims would fall under an arbitration agreement, so too would claims
stemming from death caused by those injuries. Then, parties like CSC would not
be adversely affected courts giving improper effect to the provisions of their em-
ployment agreements, and the arbitral forum would be given the deference it
commands under the FAA. 149 However, assuming Thompson is not overruled any
time soon, Ohio businesses are not wholly without means to bind their employees'
beneficiaries to arbitrate wrongful death claims.' 
50
For businesses that have not yet formed in Ohio but would like to do so, the
simplest course of action would be to operate under the laws of a state that treats
wrongful death actions as derivative of tort-survival claims. 151 A business could
either incorporate (or otherwise form) under another state's laws, or expressly set
the arbitration agreement as governed by another state's laws. If the business is
willing to leave Ohio, it could simply locate in a different state, thereby operating
under that state's laws by default.
Further, Peters gave special treatment to the agreement's specific language as
to what claims would be arbitrable. 152 The court treated that language as explicit-
ly separating the decedent's injury claims from wrongful death claims belonging
to his beneficiaries.153 Therefore, it is imperative that businesses refrain from
using such limiting language. Rather, they should use broad language, sending to
judgment on the decedent's injuries and the basis of that claim was the same as would be the basis for
the death action. One commentator reasoned the short life of this amendment could be attributed to its
"encroach[ment] upon the judicial power" in Ohio. Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform's Threat to an Inde-
pendent Judiciary, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 835, 898 (Summer 2002).
149. See supra, text accompanying notes 64-68.
150. As a preliminary matter, an obvious but hardly feasible method businesses could undertake to
bind beneficiaries to agreements would be to have all of the employee's putative beneficiaries sign the
employment agreement as binding upon them. This is not feasible because it is impossible to know
who an employee's beneficiaries will be as of the time of his death. Luckily for businesses, other more
feasible methods do exist.
151. For example, Delaware, Oregon, Georgia, and Colorado, to name a few, are such states. See
supra, note 29.
152. Peters, 873 N.E.2d at 1260 ("any legal claims or disputes I may have .. ") (emphasis added).
153. The court took this view notwithstanding that the agreement purported to bind the decedent's
beneficiaries. Id. at 1260-61.
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arbitration all disputes that arise from the employment. ' 4 Of course, the agree-
ment should also expressly bind heirs and beneficiaries, as in Peters.
VI. CONCLUSION
As indicated above, there are certainly means for a business to avoid falling
victim to a decision like Peters. However, it is a shame businesses seeking to
form in Ohio, and thereby benefit Ohio's economy, must tip-toe through their
operations in order to reach a result that upholds a logical connection between two
legal claims and maintains favor toward the arbitral forum. As mentioned above,
Ohio's statewide economy has been faltering for several years. One must wonder
if its seeming hostility toward arbitration, a proven method of settling disputes
within the corporate paradigm, is at all responsible for that economic slide. It is
certainly clear that, in terms of judicial economy, Ohio's courts stand to gain from
a change of view in this area of law. The Ohio Supreme Court holds the key to
unlock the benefits in treating wrongful death actions as derivative actions and in
giving effect to express arbitration agreements. But there is no indication that key
will ever be used.
CHRISTOPHER D. VANDERBEEK
154. See supra, text accompanying notes 80-83. Caveat: it is possible that Ohio courts would implicit-
ly read the "disputes I may have" language into a broadly termed agreement, merely to maintain the
independence of wrongful death actions from a decedent's injury claims. However, at the very least,
using broader language would give the drafter a much more colorable argument to confront a clai-
mant's challenge to arbitrability, particularly in light of the strong presumption favoring arbitration.
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